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I agree with Professor Duran that traditional logic breaks down with respect to emotions.
But it also breaks down with respect to cognitive states such as belief. Attempts to
formulate logics of belief based on normal modal systems where the laws of classical
logic hold failed miserably. This is owing to what Robert Stalnaker calls “the problem of
deduction.” (Stalnaker, 1984) An agent can believe p and q without believing their
conjunction, and without believing their logical consequences. Further, an agent can
unknowingly – or even knowingly – hold contradictory beliefs. For example, I may
believe that 2 + 2 = 4 without believing that 865 + 932 = 1,797 even though the latter
proposition is entailed by the former. Stalnaker attempted to solve the problem of
deduction by arguing that agents compartmentalize their beliefs into distinct “belief
states” which is why they fail to conjoin beliefs that are held in separate belief states.
(Stalnaker, 1984) Then is the mind really bi-logical or is it mono-logically non-classical
and paraconsistent?
Veikko Rantala (1982) and Jakko Hintikka (1975) attempted to solve the problem
of deduction by the introduction of “impossible possible worlds” into their semantics.
The traditional laws of logic fail at these impossible worlds and they are incorporated into
the believer’s set of doxastic alternatives. While this strategy got rid of the problem of
deduction for systems of doxastic logic, they effectively invalidated every thesis of
doxastic logic. (MacPherson, 1993) One can either call the resulting logic “nonstandard” or just as easily, no logic at all. Even theses of intuitionistic, multi-valued,
relevance and quantum logics fail when it comes to systems of beliefs.
A strong case could be made that the same is true with respect to the emotions.
We have conflicting or contradictory emotions, and we don’t always conjoin these
conflicting emotions. It’s not that there are two logics of the mind – traditional logic vs.
non-standard emotional logic. There may be no logic of the mind whatsoever to describe
a person’s emotions or their beliefs. We are not bi-logical beings, but rather we are
illogical beings. Whenever we describe a person’s beliefs/emotions as a whole, it is
apparent that agents are capable of believing and feeling anything, p and not-p, all at the
same time even if in different compartmentalized states. Descartes recognized this
characteristic of minds in Meditation IV when he argued that the will is capable of
assenting to any proposition since it exceeds the understanding in terms of its scope. We
are limited beings, we make mistakes, we routinely defy the laws of both classical and
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non-classical logic when it comes to both belief and emotion. This is not to deny that
restricted regions of our belief systems (such as belief states) and our emotions can’t be
made to fit rules of some system of logic or other, even if it is a little like fitting a square
peg into a round hole.
However, if I were to grant Professor Duran his claim that the emotions follow
their own system of logic resting on the principle PS, it would be a very simple logic
consisting of exactly one proposition and no inference rules except perhaps Reiteration.
Or, more to the point, it would be no logic at all. Duran is favorable to the view that a
principle guiding emotional logic is the classical principle of symmetry from ZermeloFrankel set theory, PS. (Bond and Keane, 1999) That is, if A is a part of B and B is a a
part of A, then A = B. There is a certain irony here since a non-traditional emotional
logic adheres to a very traditional set-theoretic principle. Granting for the sake of
argument Duran’s claim about the role of the principle PS in emotional reasoning, a more
apt description of what goes on when one emotively reasons is that the emotions adhere
to traditional logic, although these principles are misapplied based on some sort of
category mistake involving conflating part with whole. Though in my own view, there
are no clear-cut logical principles, classical or otherwise, that operate with respect to the
complete set of a person’s emotions or beliefs. Logic, whether classical or non-classical
goes on holiday when it comes both to cognitive and emotional states. Well, that’s what I
believe anyway.
An idea that Duran is advancing in his paper is that part-whole relationships are
treated by the mind qua emotions as symmetrical. In particular, he notes that the
emotions recognize no contradictions given that they regard affirmative propositions and
the set of all propositions as being identical based on a mistaken ascription of symmetry
to these sets. Now, if this is an accurate description of emotional reasoning, consider any
arbitrary proposition, p. The proposition p is a member of the set of all propositions, but
by PS, the set of all propositions is a member of the singleton set consisting of p from
which it follows that there is only one proposition, p, with respect to the emotions. So,
anytime we reason emotionally, we are inferring p from p by reiteration. This is indeed a
very simple system of logic with only one truth-value. Or, just as plausibly, it is no logic
at all.
As noted above, a case could be made that principles of logic does model what is
going on regionally in terms of beliefs or emotions, even if not with respect to the entire
set of one’s beliefs or emotions. Though my hunch is that we are using systems of logic
to make sense of emotional reasoning, from which it doesn’t follow that this is actually
what is going on. But let’s grant that classical principles of logic operate regionally in the
case of emotions to see where this takes us. Consider Duran’s hypothetical case of the
university student, Paula, who uses PS to infer that being a medical doctor is identical to
her whole life and also identical to getting an “A” in the course. First of all, the
identification of getting an A in the course with going to medical school is not so far off
the mark. However, Paula’s identification of her whole life with being a medical doctor
could plausibly be described as a misapplication of the PS principle. The flaw with
Paula’s reasoning is not that she is using some sort of emotional logic that violates the
laws of classical logic. Her reasoning is flawlessly classical in line with the PS principle.
The source of the flaw has to do with the truth-value of one of the premises in her
reasoning:
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Premise: Being a medical doctor is part of my whole life.
Premise: My whole life is part of my being a medical doctor.
Premise (PS): If A is contained in B, and B is contained in A, then A = B.
Conclusion: Being a medical doctor is identical to my whole life.
This argument is valid from a classical point of view, but it is unsound because the
second premise in the argument is false. There is no bi-logic here, but rather a
misapplication of classical logic. Another way of describing the situation with Paula is
that she is not using – implicitly or otherwise – any system of logic whatsoever in her
emotional reasoning – she is just emoting.
Duran suggests that there is a high level of “symmetrical depth” in Paula’s
reasoning in the sense that she identifies everything in her life with being a doctor. The
idea is that in Paula’s mind, there is no distinction between any aspect of her life and
being a doctor. If that is what is really and truly going on in Paula’s mind, then any
aspect of her life will stand in for being a doctor as worthy of her emotional commitment.
Thus, brushing her teeth is her life’s goal since this activity is a part of her life and her
life is a part of brushing her teeth, and brushing her teeth is a part of being a doctor, and
being a doctor is a part of brushing her teeth. Yet, Paula does not try to convince her
professor that she can’t brush her teeth unless she gets an A in the course. Then it is
unlikely that she is identifying everything in her life with being a doctor, and so it is
equally unlikely that there is any classical logical principle such as PS operant in her
reasoning.
Now, Duran could reply that there is a high level of symmetry in her reasoning,
but that it is not complete symmetry. This would explain why she does not argue that
she needs an A so that she can brush her teeth. But then it would follow from this that PS
is not a complete description of what is going on with Paula’s emotional reasoning since
she does not identify every part of her life with being a doctor. However, she supposedly
does identify getting an A in the course with being a doctor, and being a doctor with her
life. If that’s true, then why doesn’t she argue that she needs to be a doctor so she can get
an A in the course? It is not clear that there are any identifications being made in Paula’s
reasoning and so there is no evidence of an implicit application of PS even regionally.
What we can say about Paula is that being a doctor is very important to her, that she is
connected to this goal emotionally, but it cannot be described using a set-theoretic
principle.
Duran’s additional example of Mark illustrates the irrelevance of PS, viz., that
Mark does not identify getting into medical school with his life. Then in what sense is
there any depth of symmetry whatsoever? No symmetry is no symmetry. So the
example of Mark appears to be a counter-example to the claim that the principle of PS is
operant in emotional reasoning. Neither does it appear to be operant in Paula’s
reasoning. What one can say is that being a doctor is more important to Paula than it is to
Mark, but I suspect that when we unpack this, the principle of PS will not be involved.
link to response

link to paper
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